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Canada and the United States of America are examples of how two constitutional systems 
in the same region may adopt substantially different solutions in respect of the powers of the 
head of state. While the United States Founding Fathers opted to follow a republican and 
presidential path, the Canadian constitutional system developed a framework under the 
British monarchic background, in part as a rejection of their neighbour country’s federal and 
constitutional choices. This article proceeds with a comparison between both systems of 
Northern America, demonstrating that the powers of heads of state may vary, even between 
countries which were historically influenced by the same constitutional and democratic 
traditions, but, as a result of a multitude of historical and cultural influences, decided to 














Although different countries may be influenced by diverse constitutional traditions, the 
character of the head of state has always played a dominant role in the political lives of most 
of the states around the world. From monarchies to republics, from the ancien régime to the 
post-revolutionary periods, from authoritarian regimes to more democratic systems, kings 
and presidents have been for years the last redoubt of political power, sovereignty and public 
order in a large number of countries. In some countries, it is also argued that the moves from 
a monarchy to a republic (or vice-versa) should depend on a prior identification and 
definition of which would be the powers of the head of state (Crommelin 2015: 1118-1139). 
Moreover, in some non-presidential regimes, the role of the head of state is often questioned 
both by scholars and the public for not being entitled to play a substantial role in the daily 
political and constitutional practice, though they are asked to act at moments of political 
crisis.I 
And even though the countries of Northern America are relatively recent realities, their 
heads of state are still extremely relevant symbols of each of those constitutional and 
democratic systems. However, analysing the powers of the heads of state in both Northern 
American neighbour countries (Canada and United States) is also an exercise in historical 
and cultural research, since there are substantial differences between the peoples, cultures 
and customs of the states. 
In fact, both countries have been the subject of a vast array of influences, not only from 
European nations, but also from peoples of other continents such as Africa or Asia, as well 
as, obviously, from the American continent itself. The current realities of Canada and the 
United States were built by immigrants and are immeasurably characterized by their 
multicultural societies (although the Canadian commitment to multiculturalism is quite 
recent and the United States could be preferably characterised as a “diverse society”). But 
their political and constitutional history is substantially different. While the United States 
declared its independence in 1776 (with the establishment of the Confederation in 1781), 
Canada only had its Confederation established in 1867, though its constitutional choices were 
also affected by the example of the United States. The Canadian constitutional settlement 
was conceived by the Fathers of Confederation as a rejection of the American settlement to 
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the advantage of “a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom” – as 
stated in the preamble of the Constitution Act –, but simultaneously under “the Desire to be 
federally united into One Dominion” – as it happened in their neighbour country. 
Long before, the first inhabitants of Northern America are said to have migrated from 
Siberia by way of the Bering land bridge and arrived at least between 15,000 and 16,000 years 
ago, though increasing evidence suggests an even earlier arrival (Gugliotta 2013). However, 
the European cultural influence goes back to the Age of Discovery, especially to the 
colonisation by the British and French empires. 
Now the Canadian Confederation is celebrating its 150th anniversary, this article intends 
to present the reader with a comparison between both systems in Northern America, trying 
to demonstrate that the powers of heads of state (and constitutional systems as well) are not 
necessarily equal in countries which were historically influenced by the same constitutional 
and democratic traditions and practices, such as Canada or the United States. 
From the republican reality of the United States, influenced by a richly ideological 
revolution that, in fact, served as an introduction to the French Revolution itself, to the 
Canadian monarchic system, which has been peacefully evolving throughout times until a 
process of “Patriation” of its Constitution, the different characteristics of both systems 
require a continuous analysis. Because constitutional systems are not static realities and 
evolve side by side with social communities and their ways of exercising political power. 
As both systems were created at particular moments in history, it is also worth briefly 
mentioning how a more recent theme, such as environmental protection – an area which 
political importance has been increasing during the last decades –, is dealt under the existing 
frameworks that foresee and regulate the powers of the heads of state in Northern America. 
 
2. Heads of  state and constitutional systems 
 
Before the creation of the reality of states in Northern America, the position of the head 
of state had already gained particular relevance in the history of states, and also before the 
existence of states. In fact, the “invention” of the modern state could be attributed to 
European political history (Reinhard, 2007: 7-14), as the maximum organized form of 
political power in contemporary societies, in order to face a historical need of political 
organization, based on founding elements such as people, territory and sovereignty (de 
 
Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
98 
Vergottini 2013: 125). Before that, it is possible to find various expressions: from Polis, to 
Civitas, Res publica, Senatus Populusque Romanus, Regnum, Corona, Terra or Burg. 
Nonetheless, and though there was already a commonly accepted distinction between 
the king – or the ruler – and his kingdom – or the realm – (Albuquerque and Albuquerque 
1999: 506), it could be said that with the birth of the state – from the Italian word stato and, 
before that, the Latin origin status – that distinction started to be more accentuated. The head 
of state became now a more legally differentiated character from that new reality of what 
could be considered as the state.II 
In the liberal state, the principle of the separation of powers always represented a central 
role (Kelsen 1923-1924: 374-408; Eisenmann 1933: 163-192). The rise of the constitutional 
state, submitting to the rule of law and the representative system, was based on the idea of 
freedom and intended to impose limits to political power – historically conferred to the king 
or ruler –, dividing it and reducing its intervention in citizens’ day-to-day life. 
The constitutional monarchy was initially characterised, in England, by two centres of 
power: King and Parliament, who shared the acting of the sovereign power. The head of 
state was entitled to executive power and participated in the legislative function, limited to a 
certain number of acts, such as the king’s sanction. 
With the beginning of parliamentary forms of government, the king and the cabinet (or 
government) started to share executive power, with the king, in the first phase, as the head of 
the government. Meanwhile, the evolution of the parliamentary system attributed more 
political affirmation to Parliament, which recognized the place of cabinets with parliamentary 
majorities as holders of executive power par excellence. Consequently, the head of state became 
relegated to a mere role of indirizzo in a political system composed of the main triplet of 
Electorate-Parliament-Cabinet, based on a majority rule (Bin and Pitruzzella 2015: 145-148). 
In respect of the rights of the king, Bagehot would respond with the following well-known, 
and still frequently quoted description: 
 
“the sovereign has, under a constitutional monarchy such as ours, three rights — the right to be consulted, 
the right to encourage, the right to warn. And a king of great sense and sagacity would want no others. He 
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Therefore, the office of the head of state in parliamentary systems has seen its space in 
the constitutional framework significantly reduced to that idea presented by Bagehot 
(Roberts 2009: 13-17).  
After the Germanic experience of the Constitution of the Weimar Republic (1919–1933), 
the head of state in parliamentary systems started to be regarded as a “guardian of the 
constitution” – an expression introduced by Carl Schmitt (1931) –, positioned over pluralism 
and the different party perspectives in the political debate, as well as safeguarding the political 
unity of the state. However, according to the Weimar Constitution, the head of state had 
autonomous legitimacy and incisive powers, once he was directly elected by the electorate, 
having competence to appoint governments (even without support from the Parliament), to 
dissolve the Parliament and “emergency powers” to suspend the constitutional guarantees 
of rights. Therefore, the head of state could be an extremely relevant governing structure in 
times of crisis (Bin and Pitruzzella 2015: 270-272).  
At this point, the French Gaullist conception of the head of state should also be 
mentioned, as it is, at least in part, related to the German precedent under Weimar. In fact, 
the 5th Republic in France (with the Constitution of 1958) was primarily intended to limit 
and rationalise the parliamentarianism of previous republics. However, it went through a 
metamorphosis with the strong personality of General de Gaulle, the Algerian crisis and the 
controversial constitutional amendment of 1962 (allegedly breaching articles 11 and 89), 
resulting in a referendum, which approved de Gaulle’s intention that the president should be 
directly elected by the citizens. And since then, only in two brief periods (1986-1988 and 
1993-1995) of “cohabitation” of the president and a government from a different party, has 
the Constitution of the 5th Republic been applied à la lettre (Duverger 1986: 7). 
As a matter of fact, although the Weimar Constitution and the Gaullist conception have 
hardly influenced the constitutionalism of the states in Northern America, they are essential 
to understand parliamentary, presidential and semi presidential realities and their 
repercussions in other constitutional experiences, namely in regard of the competences of 
heads of state in Canada and the United States, which is the subject of this article. And that 
is the reason why certain historical moments should be presented in this description, starting 
with the constitutional reality of the United States. 
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3. The head of  state in the United States of  America 
 
3.1. Republicanism and the Revolution 
In June 1774, the Virginia and Massachusetts assemblies independently proposed an 
intercolonial meeting of delegates from the several colonies to restore union and harmony 
between Great Britain and her American Colonies. 
Pursuant to these calls, the first Continental Congress met in Philadelphia in September 
of that year, composed of delegates from 12 colonies. On October 14, 1774, the assembly 
adopted what has become to be known as the Declaration and Resolves of the First 
Continental Congress. In that instrument, addressed to his Majesty and to the people of 
Great Britain, there was embodied a statement of rights and principles, many of which were 
later to be incorporated in the Declaration of Independence and the Federal Constitution. 
Because of the timing of this Congress, that followed the British and French Enlightenment, 
the American Revolution and its Constitution have been over the years labelled as 
profoundly liberal and Lockean (Hartz 1955).  
However, later examinations (Robbins 1959; Wood 1969) emphasised the Republican 
ideology and motivations of the American Independence times, where the revolutionary 
literature made references to corruption, vice, and virtue. In fact, the people of the Thirteen 
Colonies were strongly influenced by the religious beliefs of the “pilgrims” of the 
MayflowerIII and they generally considered the society of the Old World as corrupted by the 
prevalence of the particular and personal aims over the general good, serving the oligarchical 
interests of rulers and politicians (Craig 1990: 317-365).  
The main idea of American republicanism was to sacrifice the individual benefits for the 
public and general goodIV of society (or the republic), as Woods’ words point out: 
 
“Since everyone in the community was linked organically to everyone else, what was good for the whole 
community was ultimately good for all the parts. The people were in fact a single organic piece (…) with 
a unitary concern that was the only legitimate objective of governmental policy. This common interest was 
not, as we might today think of it, simply the sum of consensus of the particular interests that made up 
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Accordingly, the Constitution of the United States of America had to be framed by 
Republican ideals. Its structural provisions, the separation of powers and the checks and 
balances were intended to prevent the factional political officials from potentially legislating 
against the public good. As Sunstein states: 
 
“In important respects, the departure from traditional republicanism could not have been greater. Madison 
willingly abandoned the classical republican understanding that citizens should participate directly in the 
process of government. Far from being a threat to freedom, a large republic would help to guarantee it. At 
the same time, Madison’s understanding was sharply distinct from that of the modern pluralists. He hoped 
that national representatives operating above the fray, would be able to disentangle themselves from local 
pressures and deliberate on and bring about something like an objective public good. Those representatives 
would have the virtue associated with classical republican citizens” (Sunstein 1985: 42). 
 
And probably it is as a result of this interpretation that the provisions, set by the 
Founding Fathers of the United States, and evolving since then, which regulate the process 
of election of the head of state, are characterised by a considerable complexity, discussed 
below. As a matter of fact, this complexity could be understood as a constitutional means to 
ensure that the elected official is a credible or trustworthy citizen for governing a public 
office of the Federation. Though this question has been raised recently by opinion makers 
in regards of the more radical positions adopted by Donald J. Trump’s administration. 
 
3.2. The Constitution and the office of President of the United States 
Before the approval of the Constitution of 1787, other relevant statements should be 
emphasised as part of the constitutional law of the United States of America. From the 
Covenants and other legal instruments dating from the colonial era,V to the Declaration of 
Independence, the Virginia Declaration of Rights and the declarations of the other first 
states, the principles, values and symbols provided by these texts assume extensive 
importance for those who are willing to know more about constitutional law in that country. 
It should be also stressed that the twenty-seven amendments to the original Constitution 
(of the original seven long articles), which were approved from 1791 until 1992, have the 
same legal force and represent special relevance, namely in respect of fundamental rights 
(Miranda 2014: 147). In addition, the Constitutional Law of the United States also includes 
customary law (not as much as in the United Kingdom, but still relevant) and the 
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constitutions of the fifty federate states (officially forty-six states and four commonwealths, 
which are Kentucky, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia). 
The final version of The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen United States of America was 
ratified by the Second Continental Congress (representatives of the Thirteen Colonies), in 
Philadelphia on July 4, 1776, stating in its preamble: 
 
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”VI 
 
The Declaration of Independence was heavily influenced by the Virginia Declaration of 
Rights,VII since its main author, Thomas Jefferson, was actually a delegate from Virginia to 
the Continental Congress. 
In respect of the Constitution, it is noteworthy that the fundamental law in force today 
was preceded by a previous Constitution, named the Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union 
between the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts-bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, 
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina and Georgia and which were agreed to by the Continental Congress on November 15, 
1777 and entered in force after ratification by Maryland, on March 1, 1781.VIII 
This first constitutional text predicted that each state would retain “its sovereignty, 
freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which was not by the 
Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled” (article II). 
Nevertheless, it did not provide for a strong executive and had no provision for a federal 
judiciary (Friedman 2005: 71-79).  
The only reference to a president (or something similar to a chief executive) was made in 
article IX (para. 5), where it was foreseen that: 
 
“The United States in Congress assembled shall have authority to appoint a committee, to sit in the recess 
of Congress, to be denominated ‘A Committee of the States’, and to consist of one delegate from each 
State; and to appoint such other committees and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general 
affairs of the United States under their direction -- to appoint one of their members to preside, provided 
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However, all of the functions executed by the “President of the United States in Congress 
Assembled”, as he was known, were under the direct control of Congress. As a result, he 
only performed minor ceremonial duties and often signed documents on behalf of the 
Congress as a whole.  
The presidency of those days is perhaps best compared to someone who could 
occasionally represent, and speak for, the organization in a public, official capacity, but was 
not a very important or powerful figure in day-to-day decision making. 
The Articles of Confederation were replaced by a new constitution, which created a 
strong, executive presidency (amongst other innovations). George Washington, who had 
been Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army between 1775-1783, assumed office in 
1789 as the first full-fledged “President of the United States”, a title only used informally 
until then. 
Curiously, it should be also accentuated at this point that the Articles of Confederation 
foresaw the interesting following provision regarding the possible will of Canada (as the 
British-held “Province of Quebec” was already known) to enter the confederation: 
 
“Canada acceding to this confederation, and adjoining in the measures of the United States, shall be 
admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this Union; but no other colony shall be admitted into 
the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine States” (article XI). 
 
The current Constitution of the United States of America was drafted in 1787 and 
afterwards forwarded to the states, ratified by eleven states by 1788 and by all the thirteen 
states two years later. 
Its preamble is a remarkable piece of symbolism in constitutional and political history, as 
it states: 
 
“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure 
domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United 
States of America.” 
 
Since then, this has remained the federal Constitution of the United States, and as 
Friedman states: 
 




“The federal Constitution was marvellously supple, put together with great political skill. The main reason 
why it has lasted so long is that the country – aside from the Civil War crisis – has been remarkably stable. 
The first revolution was the last. But the Constitution itself deserves at least a bit of the credit. It was 
neither too tight nor too loose. It was in essence a frame, a skeleton, an outline of the form of government; 
on specifics, it mostly held its tongue” (Friedman 2005: 73-74).  
 
In respect of presidential powers, among the seven articles of the American 
Constitution,IX the first three articles are of particular importance, for they enshrine the 
separation of powers, drawing on the ideas of Montesquieu. Article I foresees that all 
legislative powers are conferred to the Congress of the United States (Senate and House of 
Representatives), while Article II grants the executive powers to the President. The judicial 
power is presented in Article III, which is conferred to the Supreme Court and other inferior 
courts. 
As a matter of fact, the American system of a separation of powers implies not only the 
acts which are naturally inherent to the functions of such organs (faculté de statuer), but also 
the possibility of interfering in acts of other organs (faculté d’empêcher). That embodies the 
mechanism which has been named of “checks and balances” (Manin 1994: 257-293; Carey 
2009: 121-165).  
The President of the United States is, therefore, elected for a mandate of four years, 
“and, together with the Vice-President chosen for the same Term” (Article II, Section 1),X 
formally through an electoral college; although nowadays it could be said that (due to the 
intervention of modern political parties and the imperative mandate of presidential electors) 
it is nearly a direct suffrage (Miranda 2014: 160). Still, the election rules vary from state to 
state. 
At the same time, there is also the possibility that the candidate getting most popular 
votes is not elected to the Presidency, as it happened in the 2000 presidential election, in 
which Al Gore gained more votes, 50,999,897 but George W. Bush was elected with 
50,456,002 votes.XI More recently, the same happened to Hillary Clinton, who received 
65,853,516 votes, and Donald J. Trump was elected with only 62,984,825 votes.XII And the 
truth is that both Gore and Clinton, subsequently showed “restraint in upholding the 
constitutional system” (Ackerman 2010: 30). 
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Moreover, the Constitution foresees a reciprocal independence of the office holders, 
with neither the President answerable before the Congress, nor the latter dissolvable by the 
President. This comment notwithstanding, impeachment or the submission of the President 
to criminal liability by the Congress, is possible through a qualified majority of two thirds 
(Articles I, Sec. 3 and II, Sec. 4).XIII 
Functional interdependence was foreseen in the Constitution, with on the one hand 
mutual collaboration and accountability – presidential veto to bills, which may be overcome 
through a majority of two thirds (Article I, Sec. 7), and messages from the President to the 
Congress (Article II, Sec. 3), and, on the other hand, authorizations and approvals regarding 
the appointment of high officer, treaties, budgetary credits and inquiry commissions. (Article 
II, Sec. 2).XIV 
Actually, in this best example of a presidential system, the figure of the President has the 
functions of impulse or initiative, both on domestic and international levels (Hathaway 2009: 
143-268), and the Congress is entitled to deliberating, i.e. the President is responsible for the 
most relevant decisions of the mandate, but he is also under the continuous surveillance and 
effective influence of the Congress (particularly the Senate). 
As for the election of the President, it should be noted that each state shall appoint a 
number of electors in the electoral college, equal to the whole number of senators and 
representatives to which the state may be entitled in the Congress. But no senator or 
representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall 
be appointed as an elector. (Article II, Sec. 1). These electors will then vote for the office of 
President. 
Article II, Sec. 1 also determines that no person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen 
of the United States, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, shall be eligible to the 
office of President, neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have 
attained to the age of thirty-five years, and lived for fourteen years as a resident within the 
United States. 
The same article originally foresaw that, in case of the removal of the President from 
office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said 
Office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide 
for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice 
President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act 
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accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected (original Article 
II, Sec. 1). However, this clause was affected by the XXV Amendment, which clarified it, 
setting that “in case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, 
the Vice President shall become President” (Section 1) and “whenever there is a vacancy in 
the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take 
office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress” (Section 2). 
Still the Article II, Sec. 1 sets the following oath or affirmation for the inauguration on 
the execution of the office: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the 
Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect 
and defend the Constitution of the United States.” 
According to Article II, Sec. 2, and notwithstanding the formal competence of the 
Congress for declaring war (Article I, Sec. 8), the President is also the Commander-in-chief 
of the armed forcesXV of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when 
called into the actual service of the United States. 
This article foresees that he may also require the opinion, in writing, of the principal 
officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their 
respective offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences 
against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. 
The same Article II, Sec. 2 grants the President power, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur. 
Also by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, the President shall appoint 
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other 
officers of the United States. 
As foreseen in the mentioned article and section, another the power of the President is 
to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting 
commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session. And, moreover, the Sec. 3 
of that article sets that the President shall from time to time give to the Congress information 
of the State of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall 
judge necessary and expedient. On extraordinary occasions, he has powers to convene both 
houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the 
time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper. 
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Article II, Sec. 3 also enshrines the power of the President to receive ambassadors and 
other public ministers, as well as to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, and to 
commission all the officers of the United States. 
Turning now to the lack of legislative powers of the President, the truth is that, being the 
sole authority over the executive branch, the holder of the office controls a vast array of 
agencies that can issue regulations with little oversight from Congress. Examples of those 
federal departments, entities and agencies are the Central Intelligence Agency, the National 
Security Agency, the Food and Drug Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency. 
And the truth is that “contemporary political science is catching up with the rising 
importance of presidential unilateralism” (Ackerman 2010: 198). Although the increasing 
centrality of the role of the head of state had appeared well before, the presidential terms of 
George W. Bush and Barack ObamaXVI have actually consolidated a trend of a strong 
pragmatic growth of presidential powers, facing the Congress and judicial power (de 
Vergottini 2013: 687), which is currently being assessed by public opinion makers with the 
promises of Donald J. Trump. 
However, and apart from these increasing powers, the Constitution foresees that the 
President, Vice President and all civil officers may be removed from their office on 
impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high Crimes and 
misdemeanours (Article II, Sec. 4). On this issue, it should be highlighted that no president 
has ever been impeached under the constitutional law of the United States. Presidents 
Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton were successfully impeached by the House of 
Representatives, but they were later acquitted by the Senate. In the same way, the 
impeachment process of Richard Nixon was technically unsuccessful, as he resigned his 
office before the vote of the full House.XVII 
 
3.3. Case law regarding the status of the President 
In terms of executive privilege and immunity, only Article I, Sec. 6 explicitly states that 
Senators and Representatives shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, 
be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses, 
and in going to and returning from the same. And for any speech or debate in either House, 
they shall not be questioned in any other place. 
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Consequently, presidential privilege and immunity is not mentioned explicitly in the 
Constitution. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled it to be an element 
of the separation of powers doctrine, and/or derived from the supremacy of executive 
branch in its own area of constitutional activity. 
On this matter, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for the majority in US v. Nixon, 
stated that: 
 
"Whatever the nature of the privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in the exercise of 
Art. II powers, the privilege can be said to derive from the supremacy of each branch within its own 
assigned area of constitutional duties. Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated 
powers; the protection of the confidentiality of Presidential communications has similar constitutional 
underpinnings.”XVIII 
 
Some years later, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court ruled that the President has 
absolute immunity from civil lawsuits seeking damages for presidential actions.XIX 
However, the Court ruled in Clinton v. Jones that a sitting President does not have 
presidential immunity from suit over conduct unrelated to his official duties. Paula Jones’s 
suit was based on conduct alleged to have occurred while Clinton was governor of Arkansas. 
Clinton had sought to postpone the lawsuit until after he left office, but the Court stated that 
it had never suggested that the President or any other public official has an immunity that 
“extends beyond the scope of any action taken in an official capacity.” 
The Court based its immunity doctrine on a functional approach, extending immunity 
only to “acts in performance of particular functions of his office.” It also rejected Clinton’s 
claim that the courts would violate the separation of powers between the executive and 
judicial branches if a court heard the suit. Finally, the Court rejected the President's 
contention that defending the lawsuit would impose unacceptable burdens on the President’s 
time and energy.XX 
 
4. The head of  state in Canada 
 
4.1. From British province to the “Patriation” 
Given that the Queen represents an extremely important federal constitutional role, as 
her name is invoked when one refers to each of the three powers – executive (Queen-in-
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Council), legislative (Queen-in-Parliament) and judicial (Queen-on-the-Bench) – it would be 
worth investigating how this relation between Canada and the British sovereign began 
(Macleod 2012: 16-17). 
In 1583, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, by the royal prerogative of Queen Elizabeth I, founded 
St. John’s, Newfoundland, as the first North American English colony. Later, the French 
explorer Samuel de Champlain arrived in 1603 and established the first permanent European 
settlements at Port Royal (in 1605) and Quebec City (in 1608). 
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 (issued by King George III following Great Britain’s 
acquisition of the French territory in North America) created the Province of Quebec out of 
New France, and annexed Cape Breton Island to Nova Scotia. The 1783 Treaty of Paris 
recognized American independence. 
To accommodate the 10,000 English-speaking settlers, known as the United Empire 
Loyalists, who had arrived from the United States following the American Revolution, the 
Constitutional Act of 1791 divided the province into French-speaking Lower Canada (later 
Quebec) and English-speaking Upper Canada (later Ontario), granting each its own elected 
legislative assembly. 
Consequently, the two Canadas remained divided until the issuance of the Act of Union 
1840 (which is how the British North America Act, 1840 is commonly known), which merged 
them into a united Province of Canada. A responsible government was established with a 
Governor General, an Executive Council (then Cabinet of Ministers) and a Legislative 
Council. 
The British Parliament approved the British North America Act 1867, which outlined 
Canada’s system of government, combining Britain’s Westminster model of parliamentary 
government with division of sovereignty (Canadian federalism).XXI 
During the final quarter of the 20th century, a considerable number of negotiations took 
place in order to implement a political process that would lead to Canadian sovereignty, 
which is historically known as the Patriation of the Constitution of 1982 (Harder and Patten 
2015).  
The word “Patriation” was based upon the idea of repatriation but, once the Canadian 
constitution was originally approved under the British law, it could not be returned to 
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Canada. Consequently, the chosen word had to be Patriation, without the prefix re- (Hogg 
2003: 55).  
The process included the approval of the Canada Act 1982XXII by the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom, which decreed that no future acts of that Parliament would extend to 
Canada and ended the necessity to request amendments to the Constitution of Canada, once 
those amendments could be approved solely by Canada’s constitutional institutions.XXIII 
As Schedule B to the previously mentioned act, the Constitution Act, 1982 was approved, 
it amended the British North America Act, 1867 (now renamed Constitution Act, 1867), enacted 
a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, recognized aboriginal rights; amended the equalization 
formula, created an amending formula for the Constitution, and declared the documents 
which are part of the Constitution.XXIV 
Since then, there have been eleven minor amendments (from 1983 to 2011), being most 
of them limited in range, regarding issues that affect particular provinces. 
 
4.2. The Constitution Act, the Sovereign and the Governor General 
Today Canada is composed of ten provincesXXV and three territoriesXXVI and, in respect 
of constitutional powers, all executive authority is understood to derive from the Sovereign, 
who is Canada’s formal head of state. 
The state is, consequently, embodied in the Sovereign: every Canadian Member of 
Parliament is required to swear allegiance to the Queen. 
Elections are called and laws are enacted in the name of the Crown. No bill may become 
law without Royal Assent. Formally, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet are merely part of 
the Crown’s council of advisers. They govern in the name and with the consent of the Crown, 
which could be defined as follows: 
 
“As the embodiment of the Crown, the Queen serves as head of state in Canada’s constitutional monarchy. 
The Queen and her vice-regal representatives — the governor general and lieutenant-governors — possess 
what are known as prerogative powers, which can be made without the approval of another branch of 
government, though they are rarely used. The Queen and her vice-regal representatives also fulfil 
ceremonial “head of state” functions. Territorial commissioners represent the federal government in the 
territories but perform similar duties to lieutenant-governors.”XXVII 
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As a result, the Sovereign is represented in Canada by the Governor General (as in a 
number of other Commonwealth realms). In fact, the Constitution Act 1867 determines, in 
its Article 9, that the executive government and authority of and over Canada is declared to 
continue to be vested in the Queen. Following that norm, Article 10 recognizes the existence 
of a Governor General, who chooses, summons and removes (from time to time) Privy 
Councillors and Members of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, which aids and advises 
in the Government of Canada (Article 11). 
According to Article 12, the Governor General is entitled to all powers, authorities, and 
functions under the acts of the Parliament, with Advice of Privy Council, or alone. 
Throughout the Constitution Act 1867 there are various provisions referring to “the 
Governor General in Council”, which refers to the Governor General acting by and with the 
Advice of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada (Article 13). 
Furthermore, Article 14 enshrines the power of the monarch to authorize Governor 
General to appoint Deputies (from time to time): 
 
“within any Part or Parts of Canada, and in that Capacity to exercise during the Pleasure of the Governor 
General such of the Powers, Authorities, and Functions of the Governor General as the Governor General 
deems it necessary or expedient to assign (…).” 
 
For the command of armed forces (the Land and Naval Militia, and of all Naval and 
Military Forces, of and in Canada)XXVIII, Article 15 clarifies that it is vested in the Queen. 
The Constitution submits (though formally, as it will be possible to see further) the 
legislative to some control by the executive branch. As Article 17 determines that there shall 
be “One Parliament for Canada, consisting of the Queen, an Upper House styled the Senate, 
and the House of Commons”, Article 24 grants the Governor General the power of (from 
time to time and in the Queen’s name) summoning qualified individuals to the Senate. 
In reality, this power is literally tailored after the same powers of the Queen in the British 
upper house (the House of Lords). But the Queen may, by herself, on the recommendation 
of the Governor General, direct that four or eight members are to be added to the Senate, 
and so the Governor General shall summon four or eight qualified persons, representing 
equally all the divisions of Canada (Article 26). And Article 27 foresees that the Governor 
General shall not summon any person to the Senate, except on a further like direction by the 
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Queen on the like recommendation, to represent one of the divisions of Canada until such 
division is represented by twenty-four senators and no more. 
According to Article 30, the resignation of senators is made by writing and addressed to 
the Governor General. And power to appoint a Senator to be Speaker of the Senate, and 
remove him and appoint another in his stead, is enshrined in the Governor General, by 
Article 34. 
On the subject of the proceedings related to the lower house (House of Commons), 
Article 50 foresees the competence of dissolution by the Governor General, during the five 
years’ legislature of that constitutional organ. Additionally, in cases of money votes in that 
chamber, Article 54 determines that any vote, resolution, address, or bill for the 
appropriation of any part of the public revenue, or of any tax or impost, must be first 
recommended by the Governor General in the session in which such vote is proposed. 
Concerning the “royal assent” by the executive power in Canada, a bill passed by the 
Houses of the Parliament shall be presented to the Governor General for the Queen’s 
Assent, he shall declare, according to his discretion (subject to the Constitution Act and the 
Queen’s instructions), either that he assents thereto in the Queen’s Name, or that he 
withholds the Queen’s Assent, or even that he reserves the bill “for the Signification of the 
Queen’s Pleasure” (Article 55). 
However, if the Governor General assents to a bill in the Queen’s Name, he shall “by 
the first convenient Opportunity” send it to one of the Queen’s principal Secretaries of State, 
and if the Queen in Council within two years after receipt thereof by the Secretary of State 
thinks fit to disallow the act, such disallowance being signified by the Governor General, by 
speech or message to each of the Houses of the Parliament or by proclamation, shall annul 
the referred act. (Article 56). Bills reserved for the signification of the “Queen’s pleasure” 
shall not have any force (Article 57). 
On issues regarding provincial governance, the Governor General appoints an officer 
for each province, named Lieutenant Governor (Article 58), who is entitled to make and 
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subscribe before the Governor General or some person authorized by him the respective 
oath of allegiance, before assuming the duties of their office (Article 59). 
The Governor General is also responsible for appointing administrators to execute the 
office and functions of Lieutenant Governors during their absences, illness, or other 
inabilities (Article 67). 
Nevertheless, according to Article 91, it is the Queen who, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, makes laws for the peace, order, and good 
government of Canada, in relation to all matters not coming within the classes of subjects by 
the Constitution Act assigned exclusively to the legislatures of the provinces. 
On other relevant issues, namely regarding exclusive powers of provinces, it is possible 
to verify that, even in provincial legislation respecting Education (for example), the 
Governor General in Council may intervene (Article 93, par. 4), requesting the Parliament 
of Canada to make remedial laws for the due execution of the provisions of the Constitution 
Act. 
In terms of the judicature, the Governor General also plays an extremely relevant role, 
since he has powers to appoint the judges of all (Superior, District, and County) courts in 
each province, except those of the courts of probate in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick 
(Article 96).XXIX Judges of the superior courts shall hold office during good behaviour, but 
the Governor General may remove them on address of the Senate and House of Commons 
(Article 99). 
On issues of revenues, debts, assets and taxation, the Governor General in Council may 
order reviews and audits to the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada (Article 103), as well 
as having powers to order (from time to time) the form and manner of making payments 
made under the Constitution Act, or in discharge of liabilities created under any act of the 
provinces or territories of Canada (Article 120). 
Before taking seat, every member of both houses of the Parliament of Canada shall take 
and subscribe before the Governor General (or someone authorized by him) the following 
oath of allegiance: “I A.B. do swear, That I will be faithful and bear true Allegiance to Her 
Majesty [name of the sovereign].” (Article 128 and Fifth Schedule, Part 1). Moreover, for 
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every member of the Senate and every member of the Legislative Council of Quebec, a 
similar procedure shall occur in order to subscribe the following declaration of qualification: 
 
“I A.B. do declare and testify, That I am by Law duly qualified to be appointed a Member of the Senate of 
Canada [or as the Case may be], and that I am legally or equitably seised as of Freehold for my own Use 
and Benefit of Lands or Tenements held in Free and Common Socage [or seised or possessed for my own 
Use and Benefit of Lands or Tenements held in Franc-alleu or in Roture (as the Case may be),] in the 
Province of Nova Scotia [or as the Case may be] of the Value of Four thousand Dollars over and above 
all Rents, Dues, Debts, Mortgages, Charges, and Incumbrances due or payable out of or charged on or 
affecting the same, and that I have not collusively or colourably obtained a Title to or become possessed 
of the said Lands and Tenements or any Part thereof for the Purpose of enabling me to become a Member 
of the Senate of Canada [or as the Case may be], and that my Real and Personal Property are together 
worth Four thousand Dollars over and above my Debts and Liabilities” (Article 128 and Fifth Schedule, 
Part 2). 
 
The Governor General in Council has also powers to appoint (from time to time) such 
officers as deemed necessary or proper for the effectual execution of the Constitution Act, 
until otherwise provided by the Parliament (Article 131). Curiously, Article 132 foresees that 
the powers necessary or proper for performing the obligations treaties are entitled to the 
Parliament and the Government of Canada, not expressly mentioning the head of state. 
However, the usual proceedings have established that it is the Government that decides 
whether to ratify the Treaty or to introduce legislation to bring the treaty into force, after 
obtaining the authorisation to ratify the treaty by the Governor in Council.XXX 
Under the procedure for amending the Constitution Act 1867, determined in Part V of 
the Constitution Act 1982, the Governor General is entitled to issue the respective 
proclamation, after the requirements of authorisation by (a) resolutions of the Senate and 
House of Commons, or (b) resolutions of the legislative assemblies of at least two-thirds of 
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the provinces that have, in the aggregate, according to the then latest general census, at least 
fifty per cent of the population of all the provinces (Article 38 – CA1982). 
Proclamation powers of the Governor GeneralXXXI in these matters are foreseen for cases 
of amendment by unanimous consent (Article 41 – CA1982) and amendment of provisions 
relating to some but not all provinces (Article 43 – CA1982). 
As a result, analysing the provisions presented above, it is possible to conclude that, 
although the head of state is the sovereign (queen or king)XXXII, vested of “executive 
government and authority” (Article 9), that sovereign is represented by the Governor 
General, with the advice or with the advice and consent of or in conjunction with the 
Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, or even individually (Article 12). 
In respect of the office of Governor General, reference should be made to the extremely 
difficult movement of trying to take distance from Westminster rule, which reached an 
important moment in 1952, when Charles Vincent Massey, the first Canadian-born 
Governor General, was appointed. After him, a constitutional convention of alternating 
between anglophone and francophone Canadians was instituted with the appointment of 
Georges-Philéas Vanier – a Quebecer who was the first francophone Governor General. It 
is also worth mentioning that the practice of appointing Canadian-born citizens was broken 
in 1999, when Adrienne Clarkson, a Hong Kong-born refugee to Canada, was appointed the 
26th Governor General. 
 
4.3. The “Unwritten Constitution” and the Prime Minister’s role 
As far as constitutional conventions are concerned, large parts of Canada’s Constitution 
are unwritten; a critical part of the unwritten constitutional rules is “constitutional 
principles”, these derive from several related sources. 
They are inherent in Canada’s “basic constitutional structure”XXXIII or “implicit in the 
very nature of a Constitution.”XXXIV Constitutional principles are constitutional imperatives 
and they are beyond the powers of Canadian legislatures to override.XXXV One element of 
Canada’s unwritten Constitution consists of “usages, practices, customs and conventions.” 
The “rules of responsible government” are of this character. These regulate the relations 
between the Crown, the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the two Houses of Parliament. 
In fact, the Constitution Act did not provide for a Prime Minister, so constitutional 
tradition has defined this position in Canada. Here, the position of the Prime Minister 
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represents the connection between the Governor General and the rest of the political and 
administrative branches of the government. 
The Prime Minister selects his ministers from Members of Parliament and he also has 
the power to dismiss them, ensuring Parliamentary responsibility. Consequently, ministers 
may be called to the chambers to answer questions on their actions at any time, with the 
possibility that they might have to resign if losing Parliament’s confidence. In Canada, the 
Prime Minister is usually elected by a national constituency that supersedes local interests 
and that, therefore, confers on him or her an additional power before the elected house of 
the legislature, the House of Commons. Unlike the President of the United States, the Prime 
Minister of Canada can be supported by an absolute majority of seats or a relative majority 
during the administration mandate, always dependent on Parliament’s confidence, as in any 
typical parliamentary system. 
The prime minister plays the role of chief executive but also of chief legislator, since it is 
customarily the Government which introduces the most essential legislation. And although 
the competence of summoning members of the upper house is conferred on the Governor 
General (Article 24), it is usually the Prime Minister who appoints members of the Senate 
and, as the central figure in the government of Canada, the Prime Minister commands the 
access to the nation’s media (Maddex 2008: 84-85). 
Nevertheless, three political crises, in which the so-called reserve powers of the 
Governor General were used in respect of declining (or not) the advice of the Prime Minister, 
have contributed to defining the role of the Governor General as it is currently understood 
in Canadian constitutional system. 
The first case occurred in 1896, when Prime Minister Charles Tupper refused to cede 
power, insisting that Liberals would be unable to form a government despite their having 
won most of the seats in the House of Commons. In response, Governor General the Earl 
of Aberdeen refused to accept Tupper’s advice.XXXVI Then the “King–Byng Affair”, which 
happened in 1926, should also be mentioned. In that case, Prime Minister William Lyon 
Mackenzie King, already in minority government and having lost two votes asked Governor 
General the Viscount Byng of Vimy to dissolve parliament. The latter refused to do it, 
considering that parliament was should sit for a reasonable period before a new election 
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should be called, until the moment that the parliament was demonstrably unable to form 
another government (Forsey 1943; Forsey 1951: 457-467). 
More recently, during Stephen Harper’s Tory minority governments, Governor General 
Michaëlle Jean was faced with a with the choice of dissolving parliament, proroguing 
parliament, or asking the Prime Minister to resign and inviting the opposition to form a new 
government. As a result, after two hours of consultation with various constitutional experts, 
Governor General Jean decided for prorogation; the Liberals ended up changing their 
leadership and the proposal for 2009 government’s budget was accepted by the major 
opposition party. Prime Minister Harper would again request the Governor General a 
prorogation, which was granted until March 2011, when was defeated in a no-confidence 
vote. 
In a nutshell, these presented cases demonstrate that even institutional figures that most 
of the times appear to play a shy role or political position in constitutional frameworks may 
act at any moment, depending on importance of the political moments (normally in 
constitutional crises). If the powers exist, if they were constitutionally foreseen, the public 
official is entitled to exercise them. 
 
5. Actual differences and similarities of  heads of  state’s status 
 
5.1. A general constitutional comparison 
To comparing the constitutional systems of the United States and Canada is to evaluate 
two absolutely different forms of government. In fact, the “presidential-congressional 
system” (Forsey 2005: 24) in the United States was created in order to individualize a form 
of government in which the classical principle of separation of powers would be applied in 
a rigid way having, on the one hand, the legislative power dedicated to the law-making 
processes and, on the other hand, the executive branch committed to the activity of 
government (or administration). 
The President of the United States appeared to be a pure Republican head of state, 
chosen on a national basis and only entitled to executive powers. There is an effective balance 
of both powers (executive and legislative), with no accountability between the President and 
the Congress and, at the same time, the President could not dissolute the legislative houses. 
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However, the position of the President of the United States has been progressively 
enhanced, due to: (a) the federal reality of the country and the relevance of the federal 
executive; (b) the increasingly relevance of the external policy and the central role of the head 
of the executive in that area; and (c) the need of a strong presidential executive in order to 
face moments of crisis. As it was stated above, the administrations of George W. Bush and 
Barack Obama have been only the most recent examples of that increase of the central 
position of presidents (de Vergottini 2013: 687).  
  Conversely, the Canadian monarchic and “parliamentary-cabinet government” has 
progressively granted more powers to the Prime Minister (even though the position was 
never expressly foreseen in the Constitution), relegating the position of the Governor 
General, who is the official representative of the head of state in Canadian territory,XXXVII to 
no more than a ceremonial office. And the Queen, who is actually and constitutionally the 
head of state (and formally responsible for the executive branch)XXXVIII has been, in practice, 
even more distanced from those powers. 
Therefore, it could be stated that the Constitution Act of Canada appears to grant, as it 
was presented above, a myriad of powers to the Governor General (as the representative of 
the Queen), such as being responsible for the executive activity of the country, summoning 
senators, or even appointing judges. And by only reading the written Constitution of Canada, 
it could be even said that the Governor General seemed to have much more power than the 
President of the United States. But, in practice, many of those powers are, at the present 
time, distributed amongst the different branches of the constitutional system (particularly the 
competences of the Prime Minister and his cabinet). 
One interesting example of that could be the initiative of the Prime Minister for 
appointing senators, or even the effective exercise of the powers of government and 
administration by the cabinet, leaded by the Prime Minister, who represents the majority of 
the deputies elected to the House of Commons. In reality, this means that the system has 
been progressively (and through the so-called “unwritten constitution”) developing a new 
balance of powers between constitutional actors in Canada, and adapting the system to the 
progression of parliamentary democracies. 
Another curious issue concerns the powers to call a referendum, unforeseen in either 
constitution, though several U.S. state constitutions do contain the possibility of referendum. 
In the case of Canada, a large number of referendums have been held and the competence 
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for calling the national vote (both binding or non-binding) is allocated to the federal 
government, although not expressly adumbrated in the Constitution (Marquis, 1993).  
Nonetheless, there is still a vast number of powers which could be compared as similar 
between the President of the United States and the Queen or the Governor General (on 
behalf and in the name of the Sovereign), such as the office of Commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces (the President and the Queen), the power of promulgating (approving of 
assenting) and vetoing (rejecting or annulling)XXXIX bills from the legislative houses, 
appointing ambassadors or other officials, or the appointment of a certain number of judges 
(which, in fact, suggests doubts about actual separation of powers, even in the United States 
that is widely known for enshrining the referred principle and that of “checks and balances”). 
 
5.2. The example of environmental issues 
In a world where political actors are more and more concerned about the risks and 
dangers of climate change, and in promoting sustainable development, at local and global 
level, it would be relevant to examine the powers of heads of state in both countries in respect 
of environmental issues and the protection of natural resources. 
At this point, the Paris Agreement, within the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) dealing with greenhouse gas emissions mitigation, adaptation 
and finance starting in the year 2020, should be mentioned as a paramount theme. 
Particularly, after the last announcement by President Donald J. Trump that the United 
States will withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord. 
As discussed, the President of the United States, though not being constitutionally 
entitled to legislative powers, in fact controls a large number of agencies that can issue 
regulations with little oversight and accountability from the Congress. Consequently, with 
regard to environmental issues, the President may play an extremely important role, once he 
appoints the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, but subject to 
confirmation of the Senate (Lewis 1985).XL Moreover, the administrator of EPA customarily 
sits with the President in cabinet meetings, which grants this agency an essential role within 
the administration and executive power. And this is why changes of heads of state (not only 
but also the majorities of mandates in Senate) may cause relevant shifts in environmental 
policies, regulation and legislation too. 
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For example, during the Clinton presidency, the United States signed the Kyoto Protocol 
on 12 November 1998, but the Senate did not ratify it and George W. Bush opposed the 
treaty. Another example happened during the Obama administration: the White House 
Office of Energy and Climate Change Policy was created (in 2008), as a new government 
entity that would coordinate administration policy on energy and climate change, but it was 
abolished in 2011, as Congress would no longer fund the office in the budget. It now moved 
under the umbrella of Domestic Policy Council, which coordinates the domestic policy-
making process in the White House.XLI 
It was also during the Obama administration that more than 190 countries came together 
to adopt the most ambitious climate change agreement in history, which became known as 
the Paris Agreement (within the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change), for greenhouse gases emissions mitigation, adaptation and finance. And 
most recently, new president Donald J. Trump announced that the United States would 
withdraw from the Paris climate accord.XLII 
In Canada, while competences regarding the environment and natural resources are 
shared between national and provincial legislatures (Article 92A), there is a Minister of 
Environment and Climate Change (Minister of the Crown), appointed by the Governor 
General of Canada. This minister is part of the Cabinet, serving “at Her Majesty’s pleasure”, 
and responsible for the federal government’s department named Environment and Climate 
Change Canada, as well as for Parks Canada and the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Agency.XLIII 
In fact, the Governor General, representing the Sovereign, is responsible for appointing 
and removing the Minister, as deemed necessary or proper (Articles 11), but once the 
“unwritten constitution” enshrines the existence of a cabinet and a Prime Minister, there is 
no need for the Queen (ordinarily represented by the Governor General) to interfere in those 
powers. Because, as Forsey would state: 
 
“(…) in Canada, the head of state can, in exceptional circumstances, protect Parliament and the people against 
a Prime Minister and Ministers who may forget that “minister” means “servant,” and may try to make 
themselves masters” (Forsey 2005: 26). 
 
 
Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
121 
And that is an imperative conduct that should be borne in mind by all politicians who 
exercise public functions in a constitutional system, no matter if they are heads of state, heads 




In conclusion, after the enquiry described on the previous pages, it should be emphasised 
that when analysing the constitutional systems of Northern America, namely regarding the 
powers of the heads of state, the United States consists of a federal republic, with a 
“presidential-congressional” system, influenced by the principle of the separation of powers 
and tempered by a “checks and balances” structure. Instead, Canadian constitutional system 
is characterized by a monarchy, which was influenced by the British experience of a 
“parliamentary-cabinet” government. 
The President of the United States is elected by universal suffrage, though indirect 
because of the existence of an electoral college, while in Canada it is the Queen who appoints 
a Governor General to represent her and act on her behalf. 
The administration in the United States is led by the President, who is chief of the 
executive branch. The Queen of Canada is represented by the Governor General, who 
appoints a Privy Council, and among its members, a Prime Minister, who is an elected deputy 
from the House of Commons, and a Cabinet to perform the executive powers. 
As a matter of fact, both are vested with executive powers, but the Queen and the 
Governor General of Canada are only, in practice, formally tenants of that power, once the 
de facto executive branch is exercised by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. This means that 
the Constitution Act of Canada expressly foresees more de jure executive powers for the head 
of state than it is executed in the day-to-day political practice. 
Curiously, both heads of state are entitled to appoint judges of the Supreme Court (and 
in Canada, even more than that), which, in fact, suggests doubts about the actual force of the 
principle of separation of powers (Ervin 1970: 108-127). Moreover, both constitutions do 
not expressly foresee immunity for the heads of state, though there has been some debate 
about that issue in the United States, namely during Nixon and Clinton administrations. 
The constitutional systems presented are typical cases of the Common-law tradition 
(influenced by the British ancestors) and, because of that, it is possible to attest the existence 
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of a certain number of norms (especially in Canada) derived from the so-called “unwritten 
constitution”, conventions or customary law (Binnie 2011; Walters 2001: 91-141). However, 
these specificities of different systems and traditions (and their following developments) are 
the ones that substantiate the continuous study and research of comparative public law, 
generating interest for researchers beyond borders and between continents. Even when the 
application of norms and principles depend on the actions of human beings, who occupy 
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the most fundamental – certainly it is the most distinctive – feature of America religious as well as American 
political life. It is not only central to any understanding of American institutions. It also constitutes the sharpest 
difference between American and European institutions, concepts, and traditions. This country has developed 
the most thoroughgoing, if not the only truly secular state. (…) The United States is, however, also the only 
country of the West in which society is conceived as being basically a religious society. 
By its very nature the sphere of the state has to be an autonomous sphere, a sphere entirely of the “natural 
reason.” But also, by definition, a free society is only possible if based solidly on the religious individual. (…) 
This leads to the basic American concept: the state must neither support nor favor any one religious 
denomination. (…) But at the same time the state must always sponsor, protect, and favor religious life in 
general. The United States is indeed a “secular” state as far as any one denomination is concerned. But it is at 
the same time a “religious” commonwealth as concerns the general belief in the necessity of a truly religious 
basis of citizenship” (Maritain 1958: 180-181). 
IV Better known later as welfare since the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
V The English law was not absolutely repealed after the American Revolution. It must be noted that a Virginia 
law of 1776 declared that “the common law of England, all statutes or acts of Parliament made in aid of the 
common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of King James the first, and which are of general nature, not 
local to that kingdom (…) shall be considered as in full force, until the same shall be altered by the legislative 
power (…).” See Hening 1821: 127. 
VI The Declaration of Independence is available on the webpage of the U.S. National Archives and Records 
Administration: http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html. 
VII Which began with the words “that all Men are born equally free and independent”, the power to govern was 
in the people, and officers of government were their “Trustees and Servants, and at all times amenable to 
them.” See Billings 1991: 335–370. 
VIII The Articles of Confederation are available on the webpage of The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History 
and Diplomacy of Yale School of Law: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/artconf.asp. 
IX The Constitution of the United States is divided in the following parts: 
▪ Articles I, II, and III: separation of powers → the federal government is divided into three branches: 
- Legislative (bicameral Congress); 
- Executive (President); and 
- Judicial (Supreme Court and other federal courts). 
▪ Articles IV, V and VI: federalism, rights and responsibilities of state governments and of the states in 
relationship to the federal government. 
▪ Article VII: procedure used by the (at that time) thirteen States to ratify it. 
▪ Further Amendments to the original text. 
X According to Article I, Sec. 3, the Vice-President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but 
with no vote, unless they be equally divided. And a President pro tempore shall be elected in the absence of the 
Vice President, or when he exercises the office of President of the United States. 
XI Full results are available on the webpage of the Federal Election Commission: 
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm. 
XII Final results of the last election are also available on the webpage of the Federal Election Commission: 
https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2016/2016presgeresults.pdf. 
XIII This requirement of a two thirds majority denotes the presidential character of the American system, once 
a shorter majority would imply the conversion of that system to a parliamentary one. 
XIV The “legislative veto”, or a reserve of approval of actions and decisions adopted in the use of authorizations 
conferred to the President, was also a practice of collaboration and accountability, for 50 years. However, it 
was declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1983. See Rouban 1984: 949-970 and Nuno Piçarra 
1990: 325-353. 
XV Though the provision only foresaw at that time the army and the navy, air force must be also included in 
the competences of Commander-in-chief. 
XVI Barack Obama was the last President of the United States, until January 2017, before Donald J. Trump. 
XVII On the topic of the list of twenty-seven Amendments to the Constitution, the ones which may assume a 
particular relevance in the issue of the competences of the head of state are the following: 
▪ XII Amendment: presidential election procedures, regarding vote of the electors; 
▪ XVII Amendment: direct election of United States Senators by popular vote; 
▪ XX Amendment: date on which the terms of the President and Vice President (January 20) and 
Senators and Representatives (January 3) end and begin; 
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▪ XXII Amendment: number of times a person can be elected President, which is no more than twice, 
and a person who has served more than two years of a term to which someone else was elected cannot 
be elected more than once; 
▪ XXV Amendment: succession to the Presidency and procedures for filling a vacancy in the office of 
the Vice President, as well as responding to residential disabilities. 
XVIII United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
XIX Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982). 
XX Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). 
XXI On the issue of federalism in Canada, see Richard 2005. 
XXII Including a Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Part I). 
XXIII There is also a French language version with equal legal weight as Schedule A. And the Constitution Act, 
1982 is also written in both languages (as Schedule B). 
XXIV The government of Quebec has never formally approved the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
though formal consent was never necessary. 
XXV Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Ontario, 
Prince Edward Island, Quebec, and Saskatchewan. 
XXVI Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Yukon. 
XXVII See The Canadian Encyclopaedia, on the entrance of “crown”: 
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/en/article/crown/. 
XXVIII As in the United States, though the provision only foresaw at that time the army and the navy, air force 
must be also included in the competences of Commander-in-chief. 
XXIX Article 97 also determines that, until the laws relative to property and civil rights in the Ontario, Nova 
Scotia, and New Brunswick, and the procedure of the courts in those provinces, are made uniform, the judges 
of the courts of those provinces appointed by the Governor General shall be selected from the respective bars 
of those provinces. And, in what concerns the appointment of judges of the courts of Quebec, Article 98 
foresees that they shall always be selected from the bar of that province.  
XXX Procedures are available on the webpage of Global Affairs Canada: http://www.treaty-
accord.gc.ca/procedures.aspx. 
XXXI Advised by the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, according to Article 48 – CA1982. 
XXXII Currently, Elizabeth II, Queen of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and Head 
of the Commonwealth, who is represented in Canada by the Governor General, David Lloyd Johnston. 
XXXIII OPSEU v. Ontario (1987), 144; Hunt v. T&N plc (1993), 56. 
XXXIV Manitoba Language Rights Reference (1985), 64. 
XXXV See Hunt, 56; Secession Reference (1998), 54. 
XXXVI See Charles Tupper’s biography on Dictionary of Canadian Biography: 
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/tupper_charles_14E.html. 
XXXVII Article 12 of Constitution Act 1867. 
XXXVIII Article 9 of Constitution Act 1867. 
XXXIX Expressions which are used may vary between different constitutions (and even along the same texts). 
XL See also Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970 (July 9, 1970), Section 1. (b). 
XLI See: https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/dpc. 
XLII See: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/01/statement-president-trump-paris-
climate-accord. 
XLIII See Environment and Climate Change Canada: https://www.ec.gc.ca/; Parks Canada: 
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